TEORI POLITIK

Four value systems seem important here for the member of the activist organization:

1.     The legal system : how far, for instance, does the activist value the legal system? Presumably he?she recognizes that in illegal act challenges the structure of society.

2.     Political values : are political values of such importance that they can lead the activist to reject his?her legal obligation to obey the law?

3.     Moral values: what disvalue does the activist place on blowing up other peoples property?

4.     Prudential values: the threat of arrest nd punishment

In the case of the judge we are able to catch a glimpse of the communal form of life. There value system seem important:

1.     The value of the integrity of the legal system: that for the continued existence of the legal system, laws should be applied, obeyed and enforced

2.     The value of communal moral value system: according to lord devlin, a judge must uphold public morality

3.     The communitys political value system and expecially the value of compromise: J.A.C Griffith points out that in practice judges are not isolated from reality, as legal theory tells us they should be, but do take note of the political and social climate

If the legal system is applied and legal justice enacted, the judge has then carried out the obligation to apply the law in accordance with the rules lain down. The obligation to morality has also been satisfied because the person who broke the moral code has been caught and punished. At this point, however, morality is of further importance. How immoral is the act of blowing up others peoples property: how immoral is it to shock members of the community who follow conventional morality? The conclusion may have some bearing on the sentence. Political value also enter at this point, in particular the value of prudence. Is the act isolated or is it part of larger polt: if the activist receives a long sentence, will the person be made a martyr and the refore further his/her cause: will a long sentence lead to further acts of violence as a way of protest or will it be a deterrent? A careful weinghing up of these questions changes a possible sentence of there years to one of six months imprisonment. Legality and morality have been upheld but prudential considerations have qualified the sentence.

What has happened in this case is that, within a communal form of life as in an individual one, there is a hierarchy of values system: some value systems in certain instances are considered more important than others. Occasionally only one value system may come into play. For instance, in judging in picture for its beauty, our aesthentic value system may be the only one that is used. Sometimes, however, more than value system is relevant, and to know a persons form of life will indicate which system will take precendence. Indeed, if we really knew a persons form of life, we would know not only which value system but also which value within a system would  take precedence in a conflict.

We are now in a position to see in greater detail when a political system will be valued. It will be valued if it allows us to follow our form of life or it furthers our form of life. It may be that certain governmental actoins offend our moral values bat we may accept them because they agree with our prudential value system. On the other hand, they may agree with neither but we still maintain our obligation if governmental action generally agree with our form of life. Theoretically it seems that there things can disturb this maintenance:

1.     Actions or pursued which threaten our form of life

2.     Actions are pursued which are opposed to important values within an important value system in our form of life

3.     Alternative political systems seem more attrachtive, perhaps because

a.     The political system wthin which we live generally allows the existence of our form life but another will actually further it

b.     Our political system does not favour our form of life but another allows the existence of it

c.      Our political system does not favour our form of life but another will further it

When one has a political obligation to a system, one need not be concerned with every detail of legislation or with political action.

However, if legislation or political action continiutally goes against the contens of ones form of life then ones political obligation begins to waver. In other words, if governmental action indicates that the set up no longer allows or values the things that one values then quite obviously the value that was in herent in it, and was the grouns for  ones obligation no longer exists. However, this cannot provide a justification  for rebellion, as in this case rebellion would be based on the subjective a practical point of view.

Under this analysis of the concept of the form of life, if the government of the whole dies not favour the communal form of life, then general withdrawal of political obligation can take pleace. In such a case there could be a sufficient justification for a rebellion.

In practice, in spite of the failure of a political system To take not of the communal shared values, we might still decide that it is the best of a bad bunch. We would be ranking it favourably with the other available, event though we greded it against the ideal as of little value. In this case we could have a duty towards it, in conflict with other systems. It could also be the cas that, although we think that the system is fairly bad, we nevertheless recognize that there are certain change mechanisms within it that can lead to imprevements and so are prepared to give it our allegiance.

Under such an argument, political obligation becomes very personal, and perhaps to the soverign unimportant, because, although one may not have a political obligation to the system, one will still have a legal obligation to obey the laws. It cannot besuccessfully argued that one can obey or disobey a particular law depending on whetger or not one valued it. If in could then chaos would reign, and a situation similar to a Hobbesian state of nature would exists. One can deny that one has a political obligation to the system but still follow the laws of the state because of other prudential, rational and moral obligation. However, a withdrawal of political obligation will entail a hypercritical stance, as one will be suspicious of every new law or action of the government. It will also be important in extreme cases because, as we have seen, the continual irrational acts of a pathological government against the shares values of the community can lead to a general withdrawal of political obligation: the vast majority of individualis will no longer have a political obligation to the system. This leaves the legal framework on its own, completely naked, so that it will be clearly seen that the irrational laws of a pathological regime are unprincipled, that they are not derived from the principles of justice inherent in the legal tradition, and that they do not reflect the shared values of the community. This can lead to the claim that the irrational laws are illegal, event though they seem to have be passed by the legitimate procedure. This in its turn leads to the argument that the legal framework itself has become illegitimate and that this recinds our legal obligation to obey the laws : a situation of rebellion will therefore exists. A general withdrawal the viel of legitimacy from the legal system and be instrumental in instigating rebellion.